While this may seem obvious, the number of engines in an aircraft will also affect market longevity, at the fleet level and not on an individual basis. If operators are required to purchase maintenance contracts with OEMs, it follows that the payment of four engines is less attractive than the payment of two. Complete care has caused some problems for the owners. Operators have encountered problems with aging engines and need more flexible means to optimize maintenance management. “The maintenance costs are mainly due to materials that can account for 80% of the cost of OAS,” says Rubin. “Engine maintenance costs are heavily stacked around the second decade of an engine life with an increasing level of replacement or repair required, as parts wear out, and shorten average distance intervals between OASs. It is clear that PBH and total care agreements have revised the aftermarket dynamics, although improvements remain needed to maximize long-term commercialization. The first NEW technology-equipped EIS engines are subject to unknown costs, which exposes them to potential early service problems and unscheduled modifications due to hospital visits. In addition, most top-tier operators want stable and predictable maintenance costs. Those who want to invest in new engines often need OEM maintenance support.
For this reason, agreements on comprehensive care or power-by-thehour (PBH) have flourished. Maintenance priorities move throughout the lifecycle of an aircraft and engine, as well as risks and economic strategy. For example, as engines age, maintenance focuses on acquiring the most profitable parts and on the shop`s (SV) erroscopes. The operator therefore needs complete freedom in the management of engine maintenance. The dynamics of an engine as part of a Total care program are well underway. Problems arise when an aircraft and its engines have to find a new tenant. “It depends on how easy it is to transfer an existing maintenance contract that can vary between OEMs and contracts,” rubin says. “Some contracts have restrictive agreements. An owner needs control of the agreement and standard clauses to determine the complexity of the transfer of these agreements. At the same time, GE authorized the integration of the USM into its PBH agreements. Ray explains that the USM was the first SV to be used for certain engines. “This has allowed operators who have signed up for GE PBH contracts to save money at an early stage.” Nevertheless, the registration of OEM contracts requires the use of OEM-approved stores, so that control is maintained.
The lessor would be preferred for any negotiations between the taker and the OEM on maintenance contracts under an aircraft lease, but this is not necessarily the case. “Tripartite agreements are not historically common in leases,” says Bennett. “The operator communicates directly with the OEM. However, there is growing awareness of the need to involve all parties. Many SAR agreements contain a provision that defines certain circumstances as a force majeure event, which excuses one or both parties to their contractual obligations, sometimes referred to as the “excusable delay clause.” Although such a provision sometimes involves “epidemic, quarantine and government acts,” it often deals only with the obligations of the OAR supplier or, where it violates the obligations of both parties, such a clause excludes the application of payment obligations. Therefore, in most cases, an airline cannot base a payment adjustment request on a force majeure clause in a DOP agreement. The aviation industry focuses on cost reduction in all areas, with fuel, operations, maintenance and inventory the main costs.